and Christian Social Union Germany is not a country of immigration, but a country of integration.
--Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 12, 2007 America's racial disparities remain as deep-rooted after Barack Obama's election as they were before…. The struggle for racial and economic justice remains fraught.
-- (Joseph 2009) Because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve.
--President Barack Obama's Inaugural Speech, January 20, 2009 To be a full-fledged, first class member of a country, must one have citizenship, the same ethnic or racial background, or the same religion, as most citizens? How is high status related to inclusion? Do well-off individuals feel secure enough to welcome outsiders in, or do they seek to protect their benefits and status from outsiders; do poor members of a polity empathize with the excluded, or raise barriers against potential competitors? Countries answer these questions differently and residents of a country disagree among themselves. This article addresses one part of this array of questions by examining how people in ten wealthy, westernized states evaluate their own level of inclusion and what criteria they set for including others.
Our goal is systematic comparison among and within countries that are, roughly speaking, socioeconomically and politically similar but treat issues of inclusion differently. Such a comparison reveals starkly the tradeoffs in many contemporary discussions of inclusion and exclusion. But it also reveals a broader set of attitudes than Americans usually consider, and it shows that governments resting on public opinion and seeking to deal with questions of inclusion have a wider set of policy choices than most Americans perceive.
We generate these comparisons from a public opinion survey, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). In 2003, analysts from 42 countries asked a common set of 70 questions in a module on "national identity" [For illuminating uses of this survey, see (Bail 2008) ; (Kunovich 2009 ); (Pehrson et al. 2009); and (Davidov 2009 We also show how views about inclusion relate respondents' socioeconomic status,.
Some results are not surprising: white Americans feel more included than nonwhites, Christians and Jews feel more included than people of other or no faith, and citizens feel more included than noncitizens. Other findings were less predictable: nonwhite Americans resist bringing outsiders in as much as do whites; nonreligious Britons feel excluded but promote inclusion of others more than do those of any faith; Canadians feel more included than do residents of most other countries, but also express more exclusionary views than do most others.
The most powerful conclusion is one of mismatches, in five distinct ways. First, a strong sense of being included was frequently coupled with a desire to exclude others from one's polity.
Second, countries with extreme public opinion are not necessarily the countries with political controversy around questions of inclusion. Third, views of racial or religious insiders and of citizens typically differ from views of relative outsiders. Fourth, countries often cluster in groups that do not accord with our standard assumptions about geographic, cultural, or political affinities. Finally, enjoying high status does not guarantee feeling included or seeking to include others, and low status is not always associated with feeling excluded or preferring to exclude others. In short, attitudes about inclusion may not accord with one another, or with one's social standing, the views of co-nationals, the level of political controversy about inclusion, or the views of people in purportedly similar countries. No wonder the topic is endlessly fascinating, and policies to resolve issues of stratification and exclusion are extremely difficult to negotiate.
To explicate these mismatches, the article proceeds as follows: we lay out a framework showing how, in theory, status and inclusion are related. We next specify our questions and explain the data and methods. We then provide results, and finally discuss the many mismatches.
The Model of Status and Inclusion
We start from a model of a person's or group's position at a given time, conceptualized along two orthogonal dimensions. The vertical dimension is status, in which people are relatively dominant or subordinated based on some contextually specific combination of political power, socioeconomic standing, and cultural prestige. The horizontal dimension is one of inclusion, determined by some contextually specific combination of individual identity or preference, public policies, and the preferences and practices of others in the country [adapted from (Kim 1999) ]. In the static model, groups or individuals can be located in one of the four resulting quadrants, as in Figure This simple model is thus quite flexible historically, geographically, culturally, politically, and psychologically. It is especially useful if one treats the dimensions as continua rather than as sharply bounded quadrants and if the model is treated dynamically rather than statically. In this article, we use it to focus on attitudes about inclusion and exclusion rather than on groups' or individuals' actual position or trajectory across the four quadrants. The model provides a systematic way to analyze the elements of political contestation or cooperation around immigrant incorporation, race relations, religious tolerance, and the meaning of citizenship in democratic countries. As we will show, these elements relate to one another in intelligible ways, but mostly by producing mismatches with conventional wisdom.
Data and Methods
The ISSP is conducted annually or biannually around the world by independent institutions in each country. The survey items are jointly negotiated and as close to identical across countries as translation permits. 2 We created a four-item index to explore how included the respondent feels, and a ten-item index to explore the conditions for including others in the respondent's national identity. 3 A third index of four items measures status. 6 We identified which composites were relevant by plotting the estimated variance for each composite against their composite number in a 'scree' plot.
Up to 10 percent of the values were missing for some variables, which required a way to deal with the implications of absent values. We used three strategies: listwise deletion (that is, deleting the entire case if one value is missing), substituting the mean value for missing values, and multiple imputation of data. 7 None of these methods is ideal, and each has problems peculiar to it. Given this fact, and the fact that the analysis here is exploratory, we judged it most important that the same inferences could to be made regardless of the method used to deal with missing data. Therefore, we repeated all statistical analyses --correlations, Cronbach's Alpha and PCA --using each method of dealing with missing data, and we present here only inferences that could be verified across all methods.
Countries: Where the data make it possible, we compare views of inclusion across ten countries.
They are all relatively wealthy and democratic, and they all have a mix of races or ethnicities, religions, and residents with different legal statuses. All have engaged in intense political disputes with regard to questions of inclusion and stratification over recent decades, and none has fully resolved those issues. (Perhaps no country ever can.) Nevertheless, the countries vary in important ways. Three are Anglophone settler states: United States, Canada, and Australia.
Four are large West or Central European states: Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria.
Two are small Scandinavian states: Sweden and Denmark. One is nonwestern: Japan. An initial hypothesis is that these clusters of states would correspond to clusters of attitudes -but that is not the case, as we show below.
Feeling Included and Including Others
Residents even of roughly similar countries vary a great deal in the degree to which they feel included in their own national identity [see also (Antonsich 2009)] and in the terms they set for welcoming outsiders in. Table 1 and Figure 2 show the evidence for this claim: Table 1 and Figure 2 about here Looking at median or mean views of self-inclusion (columns 1 and 2 of table 1), and at the distribution of views on self-inclusion (the dotted lines in figure 2), we see three patterns.
Especially in the United States and Australia, but also in Austria, Canada, and perhaps Japan and Denmark, respondents make strong claims about self-inclusion [see also (Schildkraut 2007) ]. In
Great Britain, and France, respondents are more evenly distributed around the mid-point, suggesting that they feel somewhat included but do not assert national identity as strongly as do residents of the first six countries. And in Sweden and especially Germany, respondents show a weak sense of inclusion, or even exclusion compared with residents of the other states. In other words, Germans and Swedes feel comparatively indifferent to, or even alienated from, their national identity, or they may prefer outsider to insider status [see also (Hjerm 1998 figure 2 ). Here we also see almost exactly the same three patterns. First, most strongly in the United States, Austria, and
Canada, and to a lesser degree in Australia, Japan, and Denmark, respondents are exclusionary; they endorse high hurdles before outsiders may attain national identity. These are the same six countries with the highest levels of self-inclusion. Second, just as residents of Great Britain and
France hold relatively moderate views about their own national identity, so too do they hold relatively moderate views with regard to permitting outsiders to attain national membership.
Finally, in Sweden and Germany, respondents appear to be the most welcoming of outsiders.
Here too we see self-inclusion and inclusion of others moving toward opposite ends of their distributions; Swedes and Germans are the least patriotic, and the most hospitable to outsiders.
Nevertheless, in all ten countries there is a very strong inverse relationship at the level of individual respondents between self-and other-inclusion.
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This simple statistical analysis invites a wealth of political analysis. Judging only by these data, one would expect the politics around the incorporation of outsiders to be less contentious in Great Britain and France, the states in which people feel neither deeply patriotic nor deeply protective against bringing outsiders in, compared with the other states. In contrast, one would expect the politics around incorporation to be highly problematic in the United States, Canada, and Austria, and perhaps Japan, Denmark, and Australia. Those are the countries in which residents are deeply patriotic and deeply concerned about bringing outsiders in. Finally, from these data, one would expect Germany and Sweden to welcome outsiders.
But that is not the pattern of the politics of incorporation during the past two decades.
Denmark, Great Britain, and France have seen violence and deaths, and Australia, Austria, and
Germany have engaged in intense electoral politics over immigration and immigrant inclusion.
Conversely, Canada, Sweden, Japan, and the United States have not, at least by comparison.
Assuming that the survey accurately represents public opinion, we are left with an intriguing question for analysts and politicians: How and why have passionate advocates of one side or another in the immigration debate been able to override an underlying rough consensus in public opinion in Great Britain, France, and perhaps Denmark and, to a lesser degree, Germany?
Conversely, why has political contention around incorporation been mild in Canada, and relatively mild in the United States, at least by comparison with the riots, deaths, and nativist political parties in some European states?
The answers vary, and cannot be pursued in this article. Sometimes (as in Denmark, Great Britain, and France), a particular incident can set off a chain of responses, with violence either at the beginning or the end of the chain. Absent such an incident, perhaps the underlying moderation of public opinion can keep debates about immigration and immigrants less fraught.
At other times (as in Germany, Australia, and Austria), strongly nationalist, even nativist, candidates or parties have emerged, but there has been little violence and passions have cooled somewhat after elections. (France has witnessed both strong nativism and violence.) Although a political scientist is loathe to turn to contingency for explanations, it may be just luck that a galvanizing incident has not occurred in all countries where residents feel a strong sense of inclusion as well as a strong desire to exclude outsiders.
Inclusion and Race or Ethnicity
We can gain more leverage on public views of inclusion and exclusion by disaggregating respondents into those more and less likely to be especially sensitive to such concerns. We begin by comparing minority races or ethnicities (which we treat as synonyms) with majorities -the division that has been most fraught in the United States for centuries. Data constraints permit this analysis for only six countries; as above, we present the median and mean scores for self inclusion and including others, as well as the subsample sizes (all in table 2) and the distribution of views (figure 3). The countries are arrayed from the most-included majority group to the least. 
Inclusion and Citizenship
The 2003 ISSP contains few noncitizens in the countries we are examining, so this analysis is constrained. We can, however, compare the median views of citizens and noncitizens on including others in eight of the ten countries. Since citizens are the vast majority of respondents, their views closely resemble the country-wide views discussed above. In contrast, with one exception, the median noncitizen endorses inclusion of others much more than does the median citizen. Countries vary in the location of their citizens and noncitizens along the continuum from full exclusion to complete inclusion, but in almost all cases noncitizens are about a point or more supportive of inclusion. Only in France do citizens' and noncitizens' views about including others almost coincide.
Inclusion and Religion
Noncitizens (and therefore nonvoters) have little leverage over incorporative policies. That disadvantage does not hold for other forms of minority status, such as religion. We divided the ISSP country samples into the majority or dominant religion (Christianity in all cases except Japan), all minority religions combined, and no religion.
10 Table 3 provides the median and mean views of majority and minority religions with regard to self-inclusion and including others;
figure 4 provides the distribution of views for majority and minority religions. Table 3 and Figure 4 about here As the bulk of respondents from a given country, members of the dominant religion hold views very similar to the views of that country's whole sample. The new information therefore is the views of religious minorities. Table 3 shows that the median views of Christians and religious minorities with regard to self-inclusion (column 1) are similar in the United States, Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, and France; religious minorities in these states feel as much a part of their country, on average, as do religious majorities. In contrast, the median member of a religious minority feels less included in Australia, Austria, and Japan -and excluded in Germany. 11 However, the mean view of religious minorities (column 2) is considerably lower than the median in seven of the ten countries --the United States, Canada, Austria, Denmark, Great Britain, France, and Sweden. 12 That indicates that some non-Christian respondents feel much less included, or even excluded. Given the patterns in median views of religious majorities and minorities, and in the mean and median views of religious minorities, we conclude that some if not most religious minorities feel excluded in each of the ten states.
The distribution of views in panel A of figure 4 reinforces that conclusion. Strongly in the United States, Australia and Austria, and less strongly in Japan and Denmark, religious minorities feel less included than do religious majorities. Feelings of inclusion are similar for the two groups in Britain, Canada, France, and Sweden-and religious minorities feel slightly more included in Germany, if the very small sample size can be trusted.
In Austria, and possibly in Denmark and Japan, means, medians, and the distribution of views all show that religious minorities feel less included than do religious majorities. If public opinion underlies political contestation, we would expect religious tensions to be publicly manifested in these three states. That has occurred in Denmark and Austria -but also in France, Germany, and Great Britain (and not in Japan). So we are again left with an open research question regarding the links between feeling more or less included and political activity.
With regard to including others, religious minorities generally favor bringing outsiders in more than do religious majorities. The median view of minorities is higher than the median view of majority believers, except for Denmark (table 3, Austria and Japan show great discrepancy between religious majorities and minorities on both self inclusion and inclusion of others, which would lead us to expect political contests around religion or deep alienation among religious minorities (or both Countries vary in the number of differences that could prove volatile. In Australia and Austria, both religious groups and citizens and noncitizens disagree strongly with one another;
Germany adds disagreement between ethnic majorities and minorities as well. France, Canada, and the United States each show only one deep disagreement. Thus if public opinion translated directly into political contestation, we would expect the most severe conflicts over inclusion in the two Germanic countries and Australia, and more conflict over immigrant incorporation than over religious tolerance or racial and ethnic stratification.
The Full Model: Dimensions of Status and Inclusion
We turn finally to the full model in figure 1 , by bringing in the status dimension. The model is probably best used in analyzing particular countries, so that one can consider change over time and across groups, as well as changing meanings of inclusion and political dynamics.
Nevertheless, it enables us to reveal one more, arguably the most important, mismatch. Figure 5 uses the indices of status and self inclusion to locate four countries' respondents in the model's quadrants. We chose these four because they best typify distinctive patterns; each dot represents one respondent. Despite having very different political and personal valences, quadrants 2 and 3 are both analytically coherent. It is not surprising that high status people feel included in their country, or low status people feel excluded. Quadrants 1 and 4 are more analytically puzzling because they create two, quite distinct, mismatches. Quadrant 1 is the most politically troubling, since it includes high status people who nonetheless feel excluded or alienated from their country. In these graphs, that is most clearly Sweden's situation. Finally, quadrant 4 is politically useful, since it serves as a buffer for a country's leaders and policies. It is comprised of low status people who nonetheless feel included in or proud of their country. Among these four countries, Austria has the largest relative share of people who feel more included than one would predict from their situation in life.
The four countries in figure 6 are divided into the same four quadrants except that the horizontal dimension focuses on inclusion of others rather than on one's own sense of inclusion.
Again we have chosen countries that best typify the various patterns. Häider, with its political platform of "zero immigration," gained prominence in the 1990s.
As with self-inclusion, quadrants 1 and 4 are more analytically complex. Quadrant 1 troubles liberals, although it gratifies a conservative nationalist. This is the arena of high status residents who would prefer to exclude outsiders or make incorporation difficult. Among our ten countries, the United States shows the most high status nationalism --manifested in periodic movements to eliminate illegal immigration, repatriate migrants, withhold governmental benefits to legal noncitizens, or even revoke birthright citizenship. Quadrant 4, in contrast, would surprise but gratify a liberal cosmopolitan. This is the arena of low status people with inclusive attitudes toward outsiders. Surprisingly, Germany best exemplifies this combination among our ten countries.
One could look further at changes in the distribution among quadrants through time, links between political disputes over inclusion and public opinion, clusters of countries or groups with regard to concentrations in a given quadrant, comparisons across quadrants between the indices of inclusion, and so on. We cannot develop those extensions here, but they suggest an intriguing research agenda.
Conclusion: Five Mismatches
Patterns of belief about inclusion and exclusion are complex, not to say murky. Even these descriptive results from one survey show why issues of racial stratification, religious tolerance, or immigrant incorporation prove so difficult for democratic polities to resolve, and how crossnational comparisons open new vistas for analysis and politics.
We have identified five mismatches. Most importantly, patriotism is not associated with a warm welcome in any of our ten countries, although the consistently strong inverse relationship between feeling included and willingness to include varies a little bit across countries. At a minimum, this dynamic makes it difficult for employers to bring in new workers or for elected officials to promote immigrant incorporation; at a maximum, it can generate virulent nativism.
A second mismatch grows out of the expectations generated by the first. From these data, one would expect political passions around inclusion to erupt in Austria, Canada, and the United States -the three countries with the greatest disparity in the distribution of views about personal inclusion and the desire to include others. But none of these three have experienced as much public turmoil around immigrant incorporation as have Denmark, Great Britain, and
France. This mismatch points to the need for fine-grained analyses of the politics of stratification and incorporation, attention to conditions under which broad public opinion shapes policy disputes, and ways in which surveys do, or do not, reflect genuine public sentiment.
A third mismatch occurs among groups within a state. With some exceptions, noncitizens, members of religious minorities, and racial or ethnic minorities feel less included and are more willing to incorporate outsiders than their majority counterparts. That point is hardly news. But the details regarding disparities of opinion, gaps between median and mean views, and clusters of beliefs across these three distinctions reveals a great deal about particular states.
However, the third mismatch does not always hold, which leads to the fourth. Countries do not always cluster in the same way across the indices of self-and other-inclusion, and when they do cluster, it is hard to tell why. And so on; what appears to be a coherent cluster of countries along one dimension of inclusion often disintegrates when we consider a different dimension or another form of stratification.
The broadest angle of vision yields the final mismatch. The 2-dimensional theory of status and inclusion would lead one to expect people of high status to feel included and people of low status to feel excluded. There may even be causal links there: high status leads to a sense of pride and inclusion, or a commitment to the country generates success that leads to high status.
Nevertheless, a high proportion of people -more in some countries than in others --are in the "wrong" quadrants. They are well-off but feel alienated or rejected by their country, or they are poor but nonetheless proud of and attached to their country. Similarly, the same 2-dimensional theory points to complex views on including outsiders. To a cosmopolitan liberal, high-status nationalists or nativists generate the most troubling mismatch; to a nationalist conservative, people with low status who welcome outsiders in are the misguided ones.
The United Nations predicts that four percent of the world's population will soon live outside their country of birth; about four in ten Mexicans would like to move to the United
States. People wept for joy in Grant Park the night that Barack Obama was elected president of the United States, but people still speak bitterly of continued racism and subordination.
Mismatches between willingness to include others and feeling included in one's own polity will continue to shape political and policy disputes for decades to come. The "inclusion of others" index included: 
